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INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE
DEVELOPMENTS
DEIRDRE A. DESSINGUE, ESQUIRE
I. REVENUE RULING 79-99
In the first segment of this presentation, I would like to bring you up
to date on what has been occurring with respect to Revenue Ruling 79-
99 .1 As you recall, Revenue Ruling 79-99 required that parents who con-
tributed money to a religious organization operating a no-tuition school in
which their children were enrolled could not deduct contributions that
did not exceed the fair market value of the child's education." It adopted
an "offset test": if any benefit is received for the contribution, no matter
what the intention in conferring it, the contribution must be offset by the
value of the benefit. This was the test adopted in the Oppewal case.3
As things stood last year, we had almost reached agreement with the
Treasury on a new revenue ruling, although the IRS was not totally in
accord. In addition, there was an amendment to the Treasury Appropria-
tions Bill providing that, for fiscal 1980, the IRS was prohibited from us-
ing appropriated funds to enforce Revenue Ruling 79-99.4
Since then, we have reached agreement with the Treasury on a new
revenue ruling. This time the IRS reluctantly went along. This new ruling
is only proposed; it has not been published. It contains six examples, one
of which is essentially the same as Revenue Ruling 79-99, but with four
additional facts. This proposed revenue ruling would supersede Revenue
Ruling 79-99. This, however, is not the same as revocation. The IRS did
not want to abandon the offset test formulated in the Oppewal case. "Su-
persedes" means that the ruling restates the substance and situation of a
previously published ruling. I do not know how the IRS expects us to
believe that the six situations in the new revenue ruling do nothing more
Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108.
I ld. at 109.
3Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972).
4 Appropriations Act for the Treasury Dep't, Postal Service, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, and Certain Government Agencies for 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 614, 93 Stat. 559
(1979).
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than restate the one situation in Revenue Ruling 79-99. We agreed with
the new revenue ruling since it protected our schools. By adding facts to
the Revenue Ruling 79-99 situation the IRS did not have to rely on the
offset theory; however, we felt that it was the best we could do.
We ran into difficulties because the Treasury took the position that it
could not publish the new revenue ruling unless the rider was removed
from the appropriations bill. Certain schools were not satisfied with the
proposed revenue ruling and pushed to have the rider extended. Senator
Eagleton supported removal of the rider and the new revenue ruling. He
indicated that the accommodation of the Treasury and the IRS with the
groups representing the numerous religiously affiliated schools nationwide
was a rational accommodation to the situation.6 We did not object to Sen-
ator Eagleton confirming that, upon removal of the rider, the IRS would
announce the agreed upon revenue ruling to supersede Revenue Ruling
79-99. This letter was written on November 20, 1980 by Gerald G.
Portney who is the Assistant Commissioner of the Technical Branch at
the IRS.6 Unfortunately, the rider was continued, effective until early
June of this year. The upshot of all this is that the IRS cannot enforce
Revenue Ruling 79-99, at least until June, and according to its position, it
will not publish the proposed revenue ruling. The issue is certain to arise
again if the schools that oppose the proposed revenue ruling seek to ex-
tend the rider. We cannot predict if they will be successful. Also, Dan
Halperin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, with whom we
negotiated, is no longer with the Treasury. We have the November 1980
letter to Eagleton from Mr. Portney to rely upon once the rider expires,
but the IRS was never enthusiastic about the proposed revenue ruling.
We hope June will provide some answers about the future.
II. REVENUE RULING 78-248
In this portion of my presentation, we will be revisiting an old
friend-or enemy-Revenue Ruling 78-248. Revenue Ruling 78-248 was
both the subject of remarks delivered at the diocesan attorneys' meeting
2 years ago in 19797 and the subject of an extensive memorandum from
George Reed in early 1980.8 I was working at the IRS in 1978 when the
first voter-education revenue ruling was published. As you recall, that was
Revenue Ruling 78-160,9 in which the IRS required that an organization
See 126 CONG. REC. S16,231 (daily ed.- Dec. 11, 1980).
Id. at S16,234.
See Horkan, Revenue Ruling 78-248, 25 CATH. LAW. 316 (1980); Scanlan, Revenue Ruling
78-248: The Congress And The Constitution Be Damned, 25 CATH. LAW. 304 (1980).
' Memorandum from George E. Reed to Archbishops, Bishops, Diocesan Attorneys and
State Conference Directors (Jan. 3, 1980).
1 Rev. Rul. 78-160, 1978-1 C.B. 153.
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which obtained and disseminated views of candidates for public office on
topics of interest to the organization, was engaged in political campaign
activity and was not exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code.10 These
views were published in a newsletter without editorial comment. Because
of the widespread criticism of this revenue ruling, the IRS quickly re-
voked it and published its new position in Revenue Ruling 78-248.
Anyone who has worked with the IRS will realize the uncharacteristic
speed with which that was accomplished. The first revenue ruling was
issued on May 1, 1978 and within a month it had been revoked. While I
was not directly involved with this work, I was aware of the late-night
drafting sessions that culminated in publication of the new ruling.
What I would like to do is provide a slightly different perspective,
insofar as I am able, to provide some insight into how the IRS perceived
Revenue Ruling 78-248 and how it evinces a changed and broadened posi-
tion on the part of the IRS. I would also like to discuss two subsequent
rulings, one of which is a private letter ruling, which indicate a move on
the part of the IRS to a broader interpretation of what constitutes per-
missible voter-education activity.
Revenue Ruling 78-248 applied specifically to section 501(c)(3)
organizations.1 Essentially, it took the position that in order to avoid be-
ing classified as intervention in a political campaign, voter-education
communications must address a multiplicity of issues in an unbiased
manner. It raised a presumption that single-issue voter communications
"widely distributed among the electorate during an election campaign"
are by their very nature activities that constitute participation or inter-
vention in a political campaign."
As you may recall, Revenue Ruling 78-248 contained four examples.
The first two examples were permissible voter-education activity, the last
two were not.13 In situation three, the organization's communication con-
tained brief statements of each candidate's responses to questions on a
wide variety of issues important to the electorate as a whole, but "[s]ome4
questions evidence[d] a bias on certain issues."1 4 The ruling gave no clue
about what type of question would evidence bias, but the organization
was found to be engaged in prohibited political activity. In situation four,
a limited issue organization that published a voting record which was
widely distributed among the electorate during an election campaign was
held to be participating in prohibited political activity.15
,o Id. at 154.
See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
I ld. at 155.
I Id. at 154-55.
" Id. at 155.
I ld.
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The IRS believed that Revenue Ruling 78-248 would provide gui-
dance to section 501(c)(3) organizations concerning what does or does not
constitute prohibited political activity. In fact, since the ruling contains
little rationale, it left many questions unanswered. On September 4, 1980,
the National Office of the IRS issued a private letter ruling to an organi-
zation known as Independent Sector.' Independent Sector is a relatively
new organization, made up of both nonprofit and for-profit organizations,
whose general purpose is to support the growth and increased importance
of the independent sector. The United States Catholic Conference is a
member.
Independent Sector was engaged in a variety of activities to support
proposed legislation aimed at obtaining an above-the-line deduction for
charitable contributions. As part of these ongoing lobbying efforts, Inde-
pendent Sector decided to report the results of committee votes on this
legislation in both houses of Congress. The votes were reported in Inde-
pendent Sector's regular newsletter, which is distributed to all of its
members and to several hundred interested individuals and organizations
throughout the United States. The newsletter included a brief description
of the background of the particular vote, and a copy of the transcript
from the congressional record showing votes and comments. In addition,
it contained a brief statement urging members of Independent Sector to
write letters thanking members of Congress who voted in support of the
legislation and expressing disappointment to those members who opposed
the legislation. Independent Sector indicated that it would continue this
activity during the 1980 congressional election campaign. It stated that at
least some of the sponsors of the legislation would be candidates for re-
election, and that it was possible that during the course of their cam-
paigns they might advocate passage of the legislation.
Independent Sector also indicated that it would present testimony on
the proposed legislation to the platform committees of both major parties
Qand report the responses. Independent Sector requested rulings from the
national office of the IRS that its lobbying activities, undertaken both
prior to and during the 1980 election campaign in which some of the
sponsors of the legislation were candidates for re-election, did not consti-
tute participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf of a
particular candidate. The IRS ruled favorably on these requests.'7
Why? First, the IRS concluded that Independent Sector's testimony
and the reports of testimony before the platform committees were di-
rected toward producing a legislative result; 8 it was a lobbying activity
,0 Letter from J.E. Griffith, Chief, Rulings Section 1, Exempt Organizations Technical
Branch to Independent Sector (Sept. 4, 1980).
1 Id. at 4.
Is Id.
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rather than a political activity.1 9 With respect to the reporting of votes on
the proposed legislation in Independent Sector's regularly published
newsletter, the IRS concluded that these activities were also directed
solely at producing a legislative result and not at influencing the outcome
of any election campaign.20 The IRS reached this conclusion based upon
the following: the activities were directed toward the support of one piece
of legislation," candidates for re-election were not identified,22 the news-
letters were not timed to coincide with the election campaign," and the
newsletters were not widely distributed among the electorate.' " The fact
that Independent Sector's members and interested parties were primarily
organizations rather than individuals was an important factor.'5 The fact
that the voting records were published regularly and only incidentally ex-
tended into an election campaign was also significant."
The reason for Independent Sector's voting report not falling within
situation four of Revenue Ruling 78-248 is that even though the report
concentrated on a narrow range of issues, it was not widely distributed
among the electorate and was not timed to coincide with the election
campaign.
The second new ruling I want to discuss is Revenue Ruling 80-282,"
in which the IRS amplified Revenue Ruling 78-248. There, the IRS con-
cluded that certain publications of congressional incumbents' voting
records on selected issues in a nonpartisan newsletter did not constitute
participation or intervention in a political campaign within the meaning
of section 501(c)(3) of the Code.'6
The organization published a monthly newsletter containing expres-
sions of its views on a broad range of significant issues. The monthly
newsletter was distributed to interested members and others, totalling
only a few thousand nationwide. The newsletter sometimes encouraged
readers to contact various governmental officials to express their views on
the issues. After the close of each congressional session, the organization's
newsletter contained a summary of the voting records of all incumbent °
members of Congress on selected legislative issues, together with an ex-
pression of the organization's position on those issues. Each member's
vote was reported in a way that illustrated whether he or she voted in
19 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
$3 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
"' Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
20 Id. at 179.
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accordance with the organization's position. The newsletter was politi-
cally nonpartisan; it did not contain any reference to political campaigns,
elections, or candidates; it contained no statements expressly or impliedly
endorsing or rejecting any incumbent as a candidate for public office. The
newsletter did not comment on an individual's qualifications for office,
nor did it compare candidates. Incumbents who were candidates for re-
election were not identified and the newsletter indicated the limitations
of judging qualifications on the basis of a few selected votes. Further-
more, publication usually occurred after congressional adjournment and
was not geared to the timing of any federal election. The newsletter was
distributed only to the usual subscribers and was not targeted toward
particular areas in which elections were occurring.
This revenue ruling distinguishes situations three and four in Reve-
nue Ruling 78-248. The IRS admits that the format and content of this
organization's newsletter are not neutral because the organization reports
the votes and its own views on selected issues and indicates whether the
incumbent supports or opposes the organization's views. Emphasizing
that the organization's newsletter is not widely distributed, that no at-
tempt is made to target the publication toward particular areas in which
elections are occurring, and that no attempt is made to time the date of
publication to coincide with an election campaign, Revenue Ruling 80-282
concludes that the publication of the newsletter will not be considered
participation or intervention in a political campaign.1"
The IRS considers the voter-education issue to be important. Each
year, the IRS conducts a training institute for its exempt organizations'
employees nationwide. In 1979, and again in 1981, Revenue Ruling 78-248
was one of the topics addressed. In 1979, the IRS prepared examples of
voter-education activities and indicated its probable conclusions with re-
spect to these activities. These examples were prepared by national office
personnel. An analysis of two of these 1979 examples in light of the 1980
rulings can provide excellent insight into the evolution of IRS thinking in
this area of critical importance.
In the first example, organization A sent a ten-item questionnaire to
candidates for public office in an upcoming election. The questionnaire
dealt with topics of concern to A and its members, mainly environmental
issues. Candidates were requested to check yes or no to each question
posed, and could also add brief comments. Organization A printed the
candidates' responses in a special issue of its newsletter, without com-
ment. The newsletter was mailed to organizations and individuals on its
mailing list and was sent free of charge to anyone requesting a copy. The
IRS indicated that because the questions were designed to make the can-
" Id.
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didates appear either acceptable or unacceptable to voters who are mem-
bers of A, and hopefully to the general public, the effect of the publica-
tion and distribution was to influence voters to vote against candidates
who did not support A's position, regardless of the fact that A expressed
no editorial opinion. This activity was similar to both examples 3 and 4 in
Revenue Ruling 78-248.80
I am not sure whether the IRS presently would reach the same result.
In this example, the poll was not distributed widely to the electorate, nor
was it clear that distribution was targeted for areas where elections were
being held. This organization possesses some of the favorable criteria
enunciated in Independent Sector and Revenue Ruling 80-282. Unfortu-
nately, when the IRS relies on several factors in reaching a favorable deci-
sion, we have no guidance concerning the result when certain criteria are
absent.
The second 1979 example will sound familiar. Church B published
and distributed a monthly newsletter to its members and the general
public. B periodically included in its newsletter a summary of the voting
record of each member of Congress on a wide variety of issues. The votes
spanned a broad spectrum of church concerns, including defense spend-
ing, aid to underdeveloped nations, and the issue of school busing. In
compiling the voting records, B's staff made its views known to Congress
on each issue included in the record. The voting record indicated whether
or not the member supported or opposed the staff's position on the issues.
The voting record did not refer to any election, did not identify any can-
didates for office, and did not contain any express statements in support
of or in opposition to any member of Congress. The IRS concluded that
even though this voting record covered a wide variety of issues and did
not identify candidates, its content and structure, whereby it indicated
whether the member of Congress supported or opposed B's position, im-
plied approval or disapproval of the member and his or her voting record.
This example was considered similar to situation 3 in Revenue Ruling 78-
248 and thus was political activity. However, the IRS hedged by indicat-
ing that the final decision would depend upon all the facts and circum-
stances in the case and indicated that this activity might instead be an
attempt to influence legislation.
The result in Revenue Ruling 80-282 is in direct opposition to the
result in this 1979 example. Thus, we see evidence that the IRS has re-
versed its position, taking a more expansive view. This is exactly what did
happen. Revenue Ruling 80-282 represents the reversal of the earlier
opinion of the IRS' Chief Counsel's Office on the same case.
To summarize, voter-education material may evidence the preparing
'o See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, 155.
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organization's bias on a limited issue, if the opinions of all incumbents are
given, if candidates are not identified, if the material is not widely dis-
tributed to the electorate, if distribution is not targeted for an area in
which an election is taking place, and if the distribution is not specifically
timed to coincide with an election campaign. This, I believe, we can say
with certainty. There continues to be a problem with respect to predict-
ing the results when some of the favorable criteria are absent. It seems
that the most important criteria to be considered by an organization tak-
ing a position on the issues are distribution to voters and distribution
timed to coincide with an election campaign.
I would also like to underscore a troublesome trend-confusing the
distinction between legislative and political activity. For example, the
proposed regulations under section 4945 provide that targeting a neutral
analysis to an audience sharing a common view, and distributing a com-
munication to individuals as voters are two of the three criteria for defin-
ing an attempt to influence the public with respect to legislation .3 These
same themes, namely, targeting and dissemination to the public as voters,
also appear in the political activity area. The second 1979 example sug-
gested that given the proper circumstances, political activity might in-
stead be legislative activity. This type of fuzzy thinking on the part of the
IRS leads to further uncertainty.
In conclusion, although you may believe that the correct position is
that only express endorsements are prohibited under the Code and regu-
lations, there has been some progress, on the part of the IRS, away from
the restrictive position taken in Revenue Ruling 78-160 and the 1979 ex-
amples. The 1980 rulings indicate that these positions have indeed mel-
lowed within a relatively short period of time. We can only hope that this
trend toward more liberal interpretation will continue.
III. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AND THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AcT
In the final segment of my presentation, I would like to review briefly
the situation created by the Anti-Injunction Act 38 and the Declaratory
Judgment Act" with respect to tax-exempt organizations, and discuss the
exception created under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code."
In force continuously since its enactment in 1867, the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act provides in pertinent part that "no suit for the purpose of re-
straining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
3' Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,171 (1980).
' I.R.C. § 7421(a).
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. Ill 1979).
I.R.C. § 7428.
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any court by any person. ... "" This provision not only prohibits suits
to restrain the assessment or collection of tax but also prevents the dis-
trict court from providing equitable relief that would have such effect.
The clear purpose of this section is to give the United States a free hand
in assessing and collecting taxes claimed to be due without intervention
on the part of the courts. Prior to 1976, the Declaratory Judgment Act
provided that in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, any
court of the United States may issue a declaratory judgment, except with
respect to federal taxes." Although some courts have noted that the fed-
eral tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act may be even more
sweeping than the Anti-Injunction Act, there is no dispute that it is at
least coterminous with the Anti-Injunction Act.3 '
As a result of these provisions, prior to 1976, an exempt organization
generally could not obtain a judicial determination as to its status unless,
upon assessment and the attempted collection of taxes, the organization
challenged the IRS action in Tax Court, or, after payment of the tax and
denial of refund, it brought a refund suit in federal district court or in the
Court of Claims. In 1974, the SupremeCourt decided two cases under the
Anti-Injunction Act, Bob Jones University v. Simon" and Alexander v.
"Americans United" Inc.3 Both organizations had ruling letters from the
IRS, stating that they qualified for exemption under section 501(c)(3). In
Bob Jones, the IRS notified the university that it intended to revoke its
exemption because of its racially discriminatory admissions policy."' In
"Americans United," the IRS revoked the organization's ruling letter on
the grounds that it had violated the lobbying provisions of section
503(c)(3)."' The organizations brought suit seeking injunctive relief. 4 The
plaintiff in "Americans United" also sought a declaratory judgment. "s
The Supreme Court held that both suits were barred by the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act.44 In "Americans United" the Court held that the constitutional
nature of the claim, as distinct from its probability of success, was of no
consequence." In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court threw down the gauntlet
to Congress:
Id. § 7421(a).
" Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, § 274D(1), 48 Stat. 955, as amended by Act of Aug. 30,
1935, ch. 829, § 405(a), 49 Stat. 1027 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. II 1979)).
37 See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n.10 (1974).
416 U.S. 725 (1974).
39 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
40 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 735.
4 "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 755.
" See "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 756; Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 735.
,3 See "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 756.
" Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 727.
's "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 759.
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Congress has imposed an especially harsh regime on § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions threatened with loss of tax-exempt status and with withdrawal of ad-
vance assurance of deductibility of contributions. . . . The degree of bu-
reaucratic control that, practically speaking, has been placed in the Service
over those in a petitioner's position is susceptible of abuse, regardless of
how conscientiously the Service may attempt to carry out its responsibili-
ties. Specific treatment of not-for-profit organizations to allow them to seek
pre-enforcement review may well merit consideration."'
The opinion then suggested that this is an inappropriate matter for Con-
gress to consider.' 7
Taking up that challenge in 1976, Congress enacted section 7428 of
the Code. Under section 7428, as amended, jurisdiction is granted to the
District Court for the District of Columbia, the Court of Claims, and the
Tax Court to issue declaratory judgments in the case of an actual contro-
versy involving a determination by the IRS, or its failure to make the
determination, in connection with the initial or continuing qualification
as an exempt 501(c)(3) organization, as a qualified charitable contribution
donee under section 170(c)(2),' s as a private foundation under section
509(a),'"9 or as a private operating foundation under section 4942(j)(3).' ° A
declaratory judgment action will be available only when the organization
has exhausted all administrative remedies available to it within the IRS.
If the IRS does not make a determination within 270 days of the date on
which the organization requested the determination, the organization will
be deemed to have exhausted its administrative remedies.5 1 Action under
section 7428 can be brought only by the organization whose qualification
or status is at issue.52
Since the enactment of section 7428, the IRS has taken certain posi-
tions with respect to such proceedings and a small body of case law has
developed. At this time I would like to briefly summarize the more impor-
tant of these developments. One of the first important decisions was
Houston Lawyer Referral Service v. Commissioner,53 in which the Tax
Court established the rule that section 7428 actions would be based on
the administrative record. " Taxpayers would not be allowed to introduce
additional testimony either by stipulation or by means of oral testi-
40 Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749-50.
47 Id. at 750.
,' See I.R.C. § 7428(c).
4" See id. § 7428(a).
"i Id.
" Id. § 7428(b)(2).
-Id. §7428(b)(1).
.3 69 T.C. 570 (1978).
" Id. at 573.
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mony.55 To permit otherwise would convert the declaratory judgment
proceedings from judicial review of an administrative action into a trial
de novo. Thus, it became very important for both the taxpayer and the
IRS to pad the record with an eye toward possible litigation.
In another case, an organization requested a ruling from the IRS." It
received a ruling that the proposed transaction would jeopardize the or-
ganization's tax-exempt status.5 7 The organization nevertheless entered
into the transaction.58 Later, it filed a petition for a declaratory judgment
under section 7428 before the IRS took any action to revoke its exempt
status.5" The Tax Court granted the IRS' motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction because the IRS ruling on the proposed transaction was not a
determination within the meaning of section 7428." The court indicated
that the IRS must take some direct action that jeopardizes the organiza-
tion's exempt status.
61
In another Tax Court case, an unincorporated organization filed an
application for exemption under section 501(c)(3), and later changed its
name and incorporated.6" The court held that the incorporated organiza-
tion could not seek declaratory relief under section 7428.6" It was a new
legal entity with no standing under the provision." Also, the new entity
had not applied for an exemption and thus, had not exhausted its admin-
istrative remedies. 6
Another issue with respect to section 7428 is whether the courts have
jurisdiction when an organization requests classification as other than a
private foundation under one section and the IRS grants classification
under another section. The IRS has taken the position that such cases are
not section 7428 cases and determination letters issued by the IRS in
such cases do not contain statements of section 7428 rights.
In one such case, where the IRS classified an organization under one
section of the Code but the organization sought more favorable treatment
under another section, the Tax Court dismissed the organization's peti-
tion for lack of jurisdiction." That decision was affirmed by the Sixth
" Id. at 577.
" See New Community Senior Citizen Hous. Corp. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 372, 373
(1979).
Id.
"Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 377.
' Id. at 376.
2 See American New Covenant Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 293, 298 (1980).
63 Id. at 303.
" Id.
" Id. at 304-305.
M Ohio County & Indep. Agricultural Soc'ys, Del. County Fair v. Commissioner, No. 4811-
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Circuit."7
Where church classification is involved, however, the Tax Court
reached a different result. Late last year, the court held that it had juris-
diction under section 7428 to review an IRS determination that an organ-
ization was not a church.6 The court rejected the IRS argument that a
declaratory judgment was not available because it had issued a favorable
advance ruling under section 170(b)(1)(a)(vi).s
Finally, I would like to remind you that last year the IRS published
Revenue Procedure 80-25,'0 which modified prior procedures to take into
account section 7428. Section 7.02 provides that when an organization
withdraws its exemption application, such a withdrawal will not be con-
sidered a failure to make a determination or an exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies for the purposes of. section 7428.41 Of particular interest is
section 11.03 which provides generally that an organization will not be
considered to have exhausted its administrative remedies until the IRS
has had a reasonable time to act upon its appeal or request for considera-
tion.72 Although this appears to disregard the 270-day rule, there is an
equitable argument to be made in its behalf. When an organization files a
protest or an appeal toward the end of the 270 days, it should not be
allowed to turn around and run into court without giving the IRS the
opportunity to respond.
77x (U.S.T.C. July 13, 1977).
67 610 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
" Friends of the Soc'y of Servants of God v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 209, 220 (1980).
69 Id. at 219.
70 Rev. Proc. 80-25, 1980-1 C.B. 667.
71 Id. at 670.
" Id. at 671.

